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The Impact of Faith on Relational Thought
Martin J. Buss
Professor
Emory University Department of Religion
Atlanta, Georgia
It is easy to think of possible tensions between one’s faith and
academic reality, but I wish to address here a positive relation,
namely, the fact that the academy is indebted to religious faith, just
as theologies have in turn drawn on philosophy. Specifically, I want
to point to the fact that Jewish and Christian traditions made an
impact on a phase of thought that began at the end of the nineteenth
century and continues to the present day. A significant theme of this
thinking is the centrality of relations. In fact, in my opinion,
relational theory represents the most important intellectual
contribution of this period. It includes two major lines, both of which
will now be described.
One line emerged in the work of C. S. Peirce. He developed a
system of logic that is based on relations. Such a logic had been
initiated by Augustus De Morgan in 1859, but Peirce explored it more
fully and consistently from 1861 on.
This kind of logic involves both particularity and generality. In
doing so, it differs from earlier systems of logic.1 Aristotelian logic
had employed classes (general categories in reality) as its
fundamental notion. The particularist logic that began at the end of
the Middle Ages instead treated only particulars as “real,” while
general ideas were considered to represent thoughts about reality but
not reality itself.2 Differently, relational logic represents both
particularity and generality as “real” or at least as “possible,” even
apart from thought. It does so by treating items that enter into
relations as particular but relations themselves as general, for any
relation can be repeated, in principle, at least.3 Since a characteristic
feature of this new logic is the use of symbols, the difference between
particular and general elements can be seen graphically; in one
widely used version, general terms are indicated by capital letters,
while particulars are represented by small letters.
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For Peirce, the combination of particular and general elements in
logic was significant, for he was convinced that nominalism – which
treats generality only as “names,” or thoughts, based on particular
reality – is deeply flawed. Peirce came to this conviction on two
grounds. One ground was social. Specifically, he participated in the
critique of individualism that emerged in his time and accordingly
emphasized “COMMUNITY.”4 The other ground was theoretical in
character; it had a religious dimension.
These two grounds were intertwined and were present together in
the outlook of Melusina Fay, Peirce’s first wife, who was a religious
feminist and had a considerable influence on his thought.5 She was
sufficiently prominent to serve as the first president of the Women’s
Parliament from 1869-1877. During their courtship in 1861, the two had
intellectual exchanges, as is indicated by the fact that he dedicated
several unpublished writings to her.6 Before they married in 1862, he
moved from his previous Unitarianism toward her Trinitarian position.
Already in 1859 she had presented a feminist interpretation of
Trinitarian doctrine, according to which the Holy Spirit is feminine. The
idea of the Trinity assumes, of course, that relations are basic to reality.
Fay had connected this assumption with a social outlook. For instance,
during her marriage, she advocated and for a while practiced with the
support of her husband “cooperative housekeeping,” an arrangement in
which several families share certain activities, including cooking.7
Peirce’s relational view can, then, be seen as emerging from a
fairly widespread movement, in which feminism was pursued within
a more-or-less religious frame. An early representative of that
movement was Catharine Beecher, a pioneer in feminism and a
definite (although not traditional) Christian; in 1860, perhaps as the
first to do so in a theoretical way, she set forth a relational ontology.8
In 1885, Peirce’s male feminist friend Francis Abbot propounded an
antinominalist “relationism” that was founded in “the All-Embracing
Fatherhood-and-Motherhood of God.”9 Another friend of Peirce,
William James, had a moderately religious outlook and an
appreciation for the feminist writer Jane Addams.10 Furthermore,
John Dewey, who came out of the Protestant “Social Gospel”
tradition and retained at least some sympathy for religion, was
influenced not only by Peirce, but also by his own wife, Alice, as well
as by Jane Addams and several other feminists, as is rather wellknown; he thus reflected the same social and intellectual movement.
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Against this background, we can look at Peirce’s own view. From
early on, he had an interest in three-fold structures. This interest may
have been fed in part by the appearance of three-fold patterning in
Kant’s thought. However, Kant had not presented a good reason why
there should be such patterning. Peirce did provide a rationale on the
basis of language. Already in 1857 and 1859, while attending college,
he had explored briefly the role of the three grammatical “persons”
(I, thou, it); he pursued this pattern again at somewhat greater length
in 1861 while interacting with Melusina.11
Somewhat differently, in 1865 – as he focused on the notion of
“sign,” which had become important for logic – Peirce described the
three grammatical persons in terms of the “three relations” of a
symbol.12 Thus, an interest in triple analysis continued, although the
focus was no longer on the three grammatical persons that appear in
the structure of a sentence. He did see in the structure of the symbol
an “analogy” with the structure of a sentence. Over the years Peirce
developed his analysis of the symbol with minor variations which
arrived at the following characterizations: “Firstness” is the quality to
which a symbol refers (this quality may not be actual but represents
a possibility and is in this sense general).13 “Secondness” is the
phenomenon that a particular entity (the concrete sign) refers to
something other than itself. “Thirdness” is a potential (different from
sheer possibility, since it presupposes actuality), specifically an
interpretant (a responsive event, another sign).14
In the lecture series in which he set forth this theory of the
symbol, Peirce pointed to the fact that it corresponded with
Trinitarian thought, although he knew that the Trinitarian orientation
would not be appreciated by his philosophical audience.15 Later, he
argued that “God” has no legitimate overt place in philosophy, but he
presented an argument for the reality of God in a journal devoted to
religious thought.16 Thus, the religious perspective was important for
Peirce but was placed into the background.17
In the same lecture series, Peirce began to outline a theory of
indeterminism, or “chance.”18 This theory implied that entities are
partially independent of each other; it cohered with his relational
outlook. Indeed, relations – if they are real, not merely thought –
simultaneously connect and separate, for without a degree of
separation there are no entities to enter into a relationship.19 Such a
recognition had long been present in Christian discussions
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Trinity.20

concerning the doctrine of the
Peirce may not have been
aware of these discussions, but in 1861 he said that the three
grammatical persons “cannot be expressed in terms of each other, yet
they have a relation to each other.”21
Although it is apparent that Peirce learned from religious
tradition, he did not accept it as an authority to be taken uncritically.
Rather, Peirce came to furnish a mathematical justification for his
view that triplicity is fundamental. He argued that a triadic structure
must be a primitive or basic structure of reality, for a triad cannot be
derived from a simpler pattern, although more simple and more
complex structures can be derived from a triadic structure by
compression or expansion.22
It is certainly noteworthy that a relational view of reality, which
had not been well represented in Western philosophy after the
Presocratics, entered into philosophy at the end of the nineteenth
century. Earlier, Ockham had argued that relations are fundamental
only within, not outside of, God.23 Differently, Peirce and others in
his time came to believe that relations are fundamental everywhere.
One can then ask, “What brought about the change?” The most
likely answer is that social conditions changed. Nominalism was part
of so-called “bourgeois” culture (as Peirce recognized in 1903).24 As
such, it reacted against an earlier Platonism that had been associated
with aristocratic structures and had privileged generality over
particularity. The particularism of bourgeois culture, however,
created social havoc, with an increase in social disparity and perhaps
even an actual decrease in living conditions for persons at the lower
end of the socio-economic scale.25 Toward the end of the nineteenth
century, then, there arose the sense that a balance was needed
between particularity and generality or, otherwise stated, between
separateness and connectivity.
Such a balance may be more in line with biblical and most other
cultural traditions than was either Platonism or nominalism, which
can be thought of as one-sided.26 Thus one can see in relational
theory an acceptance and development of an old point of view, which
had been sidelined in philosophy.27 Still, one can ask, “Which aspect
– the social or the intellectual/religious – was primary in bringing
about the reorientation?” A possible answer is that, since the religious
traditions involved had a longer life than socioeconomic systems,
they should be considered to have made a long-range impact across
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol31/iss2/6
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millennia, while developments in social order had a stronger effect in
regard to shorter-range variations. However, one can leave this issue
open and simply point to the fact that there was a change in ethos,
which had a religious side.
Peirce was not alone in taking up a relational position. To
distinguish his relational way from others that emerged, his way can
be called “semiotic-pragmatist.” This dual label, “semioticpragmatist,” is appropriate for Peirce’s perspective, for his
pragmatism was concerned with the interpretive implications of a
sign. (In contrast, some other forms of pragmatism, from William
James to Richard Rorty, contained a nominalist component.)
Another relational line that emerged in the twentieth century took
as its basis the three “persons” of language (I, you, it). I call this
approach “grammatical-dialogical.” The label “grammatical” is
appropriate when consideration is given to all three corners of a
conversation – the speaker, the addressee, and something that is
discussed. The term “dialogical” is useful when only two of the three
sides are highlighted.
The grammatical-dialogical approach appeared early in the
twentieth century in several circles, which extended some older
relevant observations, working to some extent independently of each
other.28 The fact that several similar formulations became prominent
in this way shows that a broad change in ethos was taking place.
An important figure in this movement was Hermann Cohen, who
favored a kind of socialism that also values individuals, finding in his
Jewish tradition such a dual concern. Especially after retirement from
his professorship in philosophy in 1912, Cohen pursued the religious
aspect of his thought with a strong emphasis on relationality.29
However, already before then, he had dealt with relations between the
different “persons” of language. The Other, he said in 1904, is
actually the origin of the (first-person) “I” but becomes a “you” in
ethics.30 Poetry, according to what he said in 1912, is more strongly
oriented toward the “I” than is ethics, but it, too, requires a “you”
more than it requires an “it.”31
Cohen’s perspective proved to be very influential. Eugen
Rosenstock-Huessy, a Jew who converted to Christianity, applied
Cohen’s three-persons approach to literature, psychology, and
sociology over a number of years from 1916 on.32 Even more
importantly in the long run, Cohen’s analyses made an impact on
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Mikhail Bakhtin, a Russian Christian, whose work became wellknown for its emphasis on literary dialogue.33 Within the realm of
Jewish thought, the three-persons approach was carried further by
Cohen’s student Franz Rosenzweig.34
A little later than Cohen, although apparently without knowledge
of his work, a similar but more elaborate analysis was made by the
Roman Catholic Ferdinand Ebner. In reflections that began to appear
in print during 1921, he connected ethics with the use of “I”
correlated with “you.”35 God, he said, is the absolute “you” to whom
a person speaks; above all, God is one who says “you” to the
person.36 Neither “I” nor “God” can thus be properly spoken of in the
third person, although it is sometimes necessary to speak of God
(improperly) in the third person.37 God, in other words, is not an
object of impersonal knowledge but is present in personal relations.38
Ebner’s reflections echoed widely in theology and indirectly
beyond it, through their impact on Martin Buber and Ludwig
Wittgenstein, both of whom were quite influential. Buber was, like
Cohen, both Jewish and a moderate (nonstatist) socialist, although in
a different way. Wittgenstein self-identified as a Jew. The background
of Buber’s dialogical thinking, which included but was not limited to
the impact made by Ebner, has already been well established and
does not need to be described again here.39 However, associations
between Ebner and Wittgenstein deserve attention.
In Wittgenstein’s second major phase of thought, he spoke of a
difference between “language games” (pragmatic versions of speech)
and expressed in particular an interest in the difference between firstand third-person speech, both of which are social. Such an analysis
was clearly similar to Ebner’s view. The similarity may perhaps be
explained simply on the basis that the two thinkers operated within a
common cultural sphere and made reference to many of the same
works.40
In addition, however, the likelihood of a direct connection
between Ebner and Wittgenstein is indicated by the following
observation: After Wittgenstein had completed the writing that
exhibited his first phase of thought, he received as a gift copies of the
journal Der Brenner (as he mentioned in a letter to Paul Engelmann,
5 August 1921). In this journal, Ebner’s work was serialized from
1919 on, prior to its publication as a book. The mere fact that
Wittgenstein received this material does not prove that he read it.
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol31/iss2/6
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However, in one of his posthumously published notes, he described
as a “grammatical remark” a claim that one can hear God’s speech
only when one is its (second-person) addressee.41 This analysis
apparently referred to Ebner’s declaration that a human being is a
“you” addressed creatively by God. 42 If Wittgenstein himself did not
read Ebner, the substance of his thinking could have been conveyed
by Ludwig Hänsel, a close religious friend of Wittgenstein since
about 1918, who was impressed by Ebner’s work from its very
beginning.43
In notes and letters, Wittgenstein not only described but also
practiced a distinction comparable to Ebner’s. During 1936 and 1937,
he referred or spoke to God under the following two specific
conditions: (1) in those portions of his notes that were written in code,
probably symbolizing first-person speech, and (2) in letters to Hänsel
in expressions that employed the second person, including a wish
(“God with you”) and a friendly exhortation (“Think much on
God”).44 Reflections about religion and ethics appeared in those
years, as well as at other times, in analytic or descriptive (thirdperson) speech.
The distinction between first- and second-person speech, on the
one hand, and third-person speech, on the other, may shed some light
on the process of academic secularization insofar as that has
occurred. Partial withdrawal of religious speech from the academic
realm, as evidenced already in the work of Peirce, can be supported
by this distinction.
These observations by no means exhaust the impact of religious
traditions on twentieth-century culture. Religious and cultural
traditions other than Jewish and Christian also made contributions to
relational thought. These emanated from Asia, Africa, and native
America, more than can be shown here.
Although the present essay has focused especially on intellectual
aspects, mention should also be made of the fact that not only ideas
but, even more importantly, social and political programs of the
twentieth century were indebted to Judaism and Christianity. These
programs continued a biblical outlook favoring the oppressed, which
had not made a major impact on secular thought prior to the twentieth
century. Marxism – which drew on the biblical tradition, though
modifying it – provided a powerful conduit through which this
outlook entered into the academy.
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Of course, twentieth-century culture by no means fully reflected
religious tradition, and this fact can in many ways be welcomed.
Marxism (with a one-sided and highly aggressive social orientation),
Nietzscheanism (radicalizing nominalism and opposing social
democracy and feminism), and capitalism (continuing a version of
nominalism, although in actuality capitalism is not pure) have features
that are incompatible with almost all religious viewpoints and which I,
too, find objectionable. In addition, however, there are now ideals in
the culture – perhaps especially in the academy – with which I agree,
in contrast to what is said in traditional religion. Sexual equality is one
such issue. Although this ideal, expressed in feminism, can indeed
draw on some religious themes (especially, favoring the oppressed), it
represents a break with their past. It is true, sexual equality has not been
stressed in past secular thought any more than in past religion, but
secular thought may well be less tradition-bound than religion in this
and other respects. Therein lies both a potential problem, which is
evidenced by “social Darwinism,” and a promise.
The implication of this analysis can be stated in terms of the idea of
freedom, which has been highlighted in the discussion of which the
present essay is a part. To the ideal of negative freedom, which was
dominant in the nominalist tradition, relational thought added the ideal
of positive freedom, which emphasizes community. A combination of
the two freedoms can be called “interactive.” Interactive freedom is
appropriate for relations between faith and the academy. Faith and the
academy indeed cannot and should not be identified, but they can
engage in a constructive interchange, as has, in fact, already taken place.
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